摘要
本文考察了薪酬委员会在高管薪酬考核与评价中对高管薪酬与会计业绩关系的调整。研究发现,当盈余波动性较大时,薪酬委员会会减弱高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的相关性。与应计利润相比,薪酬委员会会增强经营活动现金流对高管薪酬的影响。本文还发现了薪酬委员会降低薪酬粘性给公司薪酬激励造成的不利影响。我们的研究表明,薪酬委员会对高管薪酬与会计业绩之间关系的调整是积极、有效的,设立薪酬委员会的公司对高管薪酬的考核与评价也更加客观、合理。
This paper studies whether compensation committee actively adjusts the relation between executive compensation and accounting performance in the evaluation of compensation contract. We find that compensation committee will decrease the re- lation between executive compensation and accounting performance when the earnings volatility is high. Compared with accru- als, cash flow is not easy to manipulate, compensation committee can increase the impact of cash flow on compensation con- tract. What＇ s more, compensation committee can mitigate the negative influence of compensation stickiness on compensation incentive. We get the conclusion that adjustment of compensation committee on relation between executive compchsation and accounting performance is effective, it makes the evaluation of executive compensation more objective and reasonable.
出处
《投资研究》
北大核心
2012年第9期20-41,共22页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172228、71102181)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-09-0658)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630253)
财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才培训项目
西南财经大学211工程三期建设项目(211QN10069)
西南财经大学校管课题
关键词
薪酬委员会
高管薪酬
会计业绩
盈余波动性
compensation committee
executive compensation
accounting performance
earnings volatility
