财政分权与投资偏好的地方政府行为——基于省级面板数据的实证研究

Fiscal Decentralization and Local Government Behavior of Investment Bias——An Empirical Study Based on Provincial Panel Data

1994年,中国政府通过分税制对财政分权制度进行了重大调整,改变了地方政府的行为约束和激励,我们观察到地方政府出现偏好投资的现象。为此,通过构建数理模型并提出两个假说,然后使用28个省份1994～2008年间的面板数据对财政分权与投资偏好的地方政府行为进行实证检验。结果发现,中央政府对地方官员任职控制力越强,地方官员的投资偏好就越大;在保持财政事权不变条件下,地方政府在财政分权中所占份额越小,其发展经济和增加投资的偏好也越大。

In 1994, Chinese government made a significant adjustment to the fiscal decentralization system through the tax system that changed the constraints and incentives of local government, We observed that local governments had a bias in favour of investment. Therefore, based on constructing a mathematical model and proposing two hypotheses , then using the panel data of 28 provinces （ 1994 - 2008 ） to test the relationship between fiscal decentralization and investment bias of local government. The result shows that the investment bias of local government will increase with control of the central government to local officials; under the same responsibilities, the investment bias of local govermnent will be more intense if local govern- ment obtains smaller share of fiscal decentralization.