外资技术扩散过程中讨价还价博弈的比较研究

Comparative Study of Bargaining Game in the Foreign Technology Diffusion Process

本文对外资扩散方和内资接受方的技术授让价格谈判或仲裁的若干要素量化,构造双方的讨价还价博弈模型,分别采用均等收益原则和最大收益原则对双方效用进行度量比较,发现纳什讨价还价均衡解可以被视为均等收益原则和最大化收益原则的一个自然综合,接着探讨了可转让效用条件下的博弈均衡解,最后用算例进行了演示计算,以给出不一致同意的均衡理论以及最小化最大值理论的适用范围。

Based on the perspective of game theory, several elements of price negotiation or arbitration between foreign diffusion party and domestic receiving party was quantitative. Then the paper constructed bargaining game model, measured utilities of both sides based on equal income principle and income maximization principle respectively for comparison, discovered that Nash bargaining equilibrium results can be considered a natural synthesis of equal income principle and income maximization principle, then discussed the game equilibrium under the condition of transferable utilities. Finally, a computational example was demonstrated so as to give proper scope of the equilibrium theory of disagreement and the minimax-values theory.