普通法框架下的投资者保护问题研究

Investor protection under the common law framework

以中国儒学的观念为基础,建立数学模型对普通法框架下的投资者保护问题进行了研究,获得了以下结论.首先,有效的小股东保护将导致控股股东持股随时间递减,而且这个结果与是否存在诉讼成本或者成本由谁承担无关.其次,如果诉讼成本不变,有效保护小股东的法律将遵循自我强化的路径演化.如果罚金水平保持不变,有效保护小股东的法律将导致诉讼成本随时间递增.这个结果并不会受到诉讼成本由谁承担的影响.最后,由小股东或者控股股东承担成本将导致诉讼成本随罚金水平递增或者递减.

Based on the Chinese Confucianism, a mathematical model is built to analyze investor protection under the common law framework and some conclusions are obtained. First, effective small investor protection will lead to the decreasing in the shareholding ratio of controllers with time, which is independent of whether or not litigation cost exists or how to share the litigation cost. Second, given the litigation cost, effective law pro- tection of small investors will evolve along the self-reinforcement path. But, given the ratio of penalty, the effective law will lead to the litigation cost increasing with time, which can not be influenced by who pays the litigation cost. Last, paying the litigation cost by minority shareholders or controllers will lead to the litigation cost increasing or decreasing with penalty.