我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究

Research on Adverse Selection of Enterprise Annuity and Moral Hazard Management in China

当前形势下我国人口老龄化问题日益凸显,基本养老保险制度面临着巨大的支付压力。企业年金在缓解基本养老保险给付方面起到了重大的补充作用,但是我国现行的企业年金在实际运营管理中存在很多问题。论文从委托代理角度分析企业年金各主体之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出几点相关政策建议,以完善我国企业年金制度,使其更好地为企业职工提供更安全更实惠的社会福利。

Under current situation, the problem of aging of the population becomes increasingly prominent in China, the basic pension insurance system face great payment pressure. Enterprise annuity plays very important supplement role for the relief of basic pension insurance payment, however, the practical operation management of enterprise annuity in China exists a lot of problems. This paper analyzes the adverse selection and moral hazard problem among different bodies from the perspective of principle-agent, and provides several policy suggestions to perfect enterprise annuity system in China, and therefore provide safer and more affordable society benefit for enterprises＇ employees.