期刊文献+

重复模糊简约合作对策核心的特征

Characterization of Cores for the Repeated Fuzzy Reduced Cooperative Games
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摘要 将简约对策模型和模糊简约模型进行了拓展,加入重复模糊对策理论,构建了重复模糊简约合作对策模型并研究了其核心的公理化特征. The repeated fuzzy theory was combined with the reduced game and the fuzzy reduced game to established the repeated fuzzy reduced cooperative game mode.The characterization of cores for the repeated fuzzy reduced game was studied.
作者 徐刚 于泳波
出处 《郑州大学学报(理学版)》 CAS 北大核心 2012年第3期34-37,共4页 Journal of Zhengzhou University:Natural Science Edition
关键词 简约对策 重复模糊对策 核心 特征 reduced game repeated fuzzy game core characterization
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参考文献5

  • 1Davis M, Maschler M. The kernel of a cooperative game [ J ]. Naval Research Quarterly, 1965,12 (3) : 223 - 259.
  • 2Aubin J P. Coeur et valeur des jeux flous a paiements lateraux[J]. C R Acad Sci Paris:A, 1974, 279:891 -894.
  • 3Kalai E. Bounded rationality and strategic complexity in repeated games[ C ]//Sandiego CA:Academic Press, 1990:131 -157.
  • 4Oviedo J. The core of a repeated n-person cooperative game [ J ]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2000,127 (3) :519 -524.
  • 5Hwang Y A. Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core[J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2007,158(22) : 2480 -2493.

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