终极控制人、控制权转移与投资效率--基于上市公司并购事件的研究

Ultimate Controllers,Transferences of Corporate Control and Investment Efficiency——Research Based on M&A Cases of Listed Companies

本文对2007～2009年三年间中国证券市场上所发生的以上市公司为标的的并购事件进行了实证研究,检验了终极所有权结构对并购过程中控制权转移的影响和并购前后投资效率变化状况。研究发现,并购目标公司终极控制人的两权分离度与并购过程中控制权发生转移的倾向具有显著的关联,并购交易前后资本投资效率具有显著变化。具体而言:(1)终极控制人两权分离度与并购交易中控制权发生转移的倾向显著负相关,进一步的研究表明终极控制人为国有性质时更容易发生控制权的转移。(2)并购交易后公司非效率投资程度比并购前显著改善,其中未发生控制权转移的并购交易比发生控制权转移的并购交易非效率投资程度改善更为明显。本文提供的经验证据总体上支持了并购效率理论及协同效应理论,在控制权发生转移的情况下支持了自由现金理论和管理者自大理论,丰富了公司治理及企业管理研究文献,为公司治理和改善投资效率提出了新课题。

This article examines the impact of the ultimate ownership structure on transferences of corporate control during the M＆A process and the improvement of investment efficiency after M＆A than before based on M＆A events of Chi- na~ Listed Companies during 2007 and 2009. The result suggests that the tendency of transferences of corporate control has a significant association with the degree of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights, and capital investment efficiency has a significant change after the M＆A. Specifically： （ 1 ） the degree of the separation of control fights from cash flow rights of the ultimate controllers has a significant negative correlation with the tendency of transferences of Corpo- rate Control. And further research shows that the state - owned ultimate controllers are more prone to loss control rights af- ter the M＆A. （2） the degree of non - efficient investments after the M＆A is significantly decreased than that before M＆A, and it is more evident for the M＆A transactions without transferences of corporate Control to decrease the degree of non - efficient investments than those with transferences of corporate control. This article provides empirical evidence for theEfficiency Theory and the Synergetic Effects Hypothesis of the M＆A in general and for the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and the Hubris Hypothesis in the case of control transferring, which enriches the research literatures of corporate govern- ance and corporate management.