市场竞争下的三阶段动态博弈频谱接入算法

A Three Stage Market Competition-based Dynamic Game of Spectrum Access Algorithm

采用两级动态频谱接入网络模型,提出了基于市场竞争的三阶段动态博弈频谱接入算法。利用逆推法和Bertrand博弈理论解决动态频谱接入问题。两个寡头(移动虚拟运营商:MVNO)先后确定所需频谱数并进行价格竞争吸引终端次用户,次用户可根据对速率和价格的不同偏好进行选择。理论推导和仿真分析了算法的正确性和稳定性,证明该算法存在唯一纳什均衡。仿真结果表明,MVNOs可以灵活做出最优投资和价格决定,达到收益最大化,为实际应用提供了参考模型。

A three stage market competition-based dynamic game of spectrum access algorithm is proposed by using a two-layer dynamic spectrum access network model.Backward induction and Bertrand game theory are adopted to solve the spectrum access problem.Two duopoly mobile virtual operators（MVNO） determine the amounts of the spectrum in succession and attracts the secondary end users by the price.The end users make their spectrum access options based on the heterogeneous preference over the rates and prices.The accuracy and stability of the algorithm has been analyzed theoretically and certificated by the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium.The simulation results show that the MVNOs could make investment optimally,pricing decisions flexibly,and maximize their profits.Such algorithm also provides a reference model for the practical application.