产权性质、风险业绩和薪酬粘性

Nature of Controlling Shareholder, Risk-Based Performance and Compensation Stickiness

本文基于公允价值在企业会计准则中被广泛应用的制度背景，把公司业绩按照风险程度以及与管理层的努力程度的关系分为营业业绩和风险业绩，并比较分析高管薪酬与不同风险业绩的粘性程度，以期从高管薪酬机制中关于对高管投资行为规定的特点找到对管理层投资行为的直接解释。我们以2007—2010年有公允价值变动损益的1380个样本为研究对象，比较分析了高管薪酬与营业业绩和风险业绩的敏感度以及粘性特征，并结合上市公司的产权特征进行了透彻的分析。我们发现，高管薪酬与业绩存在粘性，而且该粘性特征在地方控股企业明显高于中央控股企业，而民营企业的高管薪酬粘性特征较弱。我们还进一步发现，高管薪酬与营业业绩的粘性较弱，而与风险业绩存在较为明显的粘性特征。高管薪酬与风险业绩的粘性特征在地方控股企业中显著高于中央控股企业。

Based on the system background that fair value is widely used in corporate ac- counting standards, this paper divides performance into operating performance and risk-based performance in accordance with the relationship between the degree of risk and management effort, and also compares the sensitivity of executive pay and risk performance, in order to find the explanation of management risk appetite in China. Making use of 1 380 sampleswhich have profit and loss from fair value changes from the year 2007 to 2010, we pick up op- erating profit and profit and loss from fair value changes from corporate performance, and an- alyze the stickiness characteristics of executive compensation with operating performance and risk-based performance. We find that executive pay has stickiness. Moreover, the stickiness characteristic in local government holding companies is significantly stronger than that in cen- tral government holding enterprises, and the stickiness of executive pay is low in private cor- porations. We further find that the stickiness between executive compensation and operating performance is low, while there＇s obvious stickiness between executive pay and risk-based performance. Also, the stickiness between executive pay and risk-based performance in local government holding enterprises is significantly higher than that in central government holding companies.