上市公司定向增发时机选择行为研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

Timing Behavior's Effect on Private Placement Discount

本文以2006年至2010年第3季度定向增发事件作为样本,从市场择时角度分析了定向增发折价背后的动机及经济后果。结果表明:二级市场错误定价对定向增发折价影响明显,公司市场价值被高估的幅度越大,定向增发折价越大,定向增发折价是对公司价值偏离的补偿。但对公司价值偏离补偿并不能完全解释定向增发折价,因为整体市场行情越好时折价越大,并且多数公司倾向于在整体市场行情高涨时进行定向增发,表明定向增发中存在明显的市场行情择时行为,其结果是定向增发认购股东对其他股东利益侵害。

In this paper,we use the event of private placements from 2006 to 2010 third quarter as the sample to analyze the motivations behind and economic consequences of discount from the perspective of market timing.The empirical results show that:(1)The efficiency of secondary market pricing have a significant effect on private placement discount.The more market overvalued, the greater the discount of private placement.The discount is compensation for value deviation.(2)However,value deviation cannot fully explain discount,because when the overall market better,the discount bigger,and the majority of companies tend to issue stocks when the market is hot.This suggests that there exist obvious market timing behavior in private placements.The results show that the private placement's shareholders enroach on other shareholders.