基于控制权私人收益的金融高管过度冒险行为分析

Excessive Risk Taking of Financial Top Managers Based on Private Benefits of Control Right

道德风险一直被认为是导致金融危机的重要原因。通过将控制权私人收益引入到动态资产定价模型中,在考虑财务危机成本的基础上,构建了金融高管的风险选择决策函数。基于数字算例和实证分析,私人收益的存在导致了金融高管选择远高于股东最优的风险水平。这说明约束高管过度冒险行为的最有效方法是对控制权私人收益进行限制。

Moral hazard is still considered as the core cause of financial crisis.By introducing the private benefits of control right into the model of dynamical asset pricing,this paper constructs a function of risk choice decision of top managers when financial institutions have to undertake the costs of financial distress.A digital example and empirical study proves that top managers tend to take excessive risks to obtain more private benefits.The best method to constrain excessive risk taking is decreasing private benefits of control right.