摘要
创业企业的发展是创业者和投资者基于资源互补开展合作共同倾注努力的结果。由于风险企业特殊的信息结构特征,创业者和投资者之间存在严重的委托-代理问题,而双边努力互补效应是其中一个主要的道德风险问题。本文通过建立基于参与双方的努力互补效应在不完全信息条件下的收益分配模型,从解决激励创业者、投资者为创业企业做出努力的互补效应问题出发,确定最优的风险企业股权结构。
The development of entrepreneurial companies is the result of joint efforts ofentrepreneurs and inveswtors who aollaborate based on complementary resources. Due to special structural features of venture capital, a serious principal-agent problem exists between the entrepreneurs and investors, in which complementary effect of bilateral efforts is one of the major moral hazard problems. This paper sets up the venture capital income distribution model, based on complementary effects with incomplete information, to determine the optimal equity allocation.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第9期106-110,共5页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102063)
中央高校基本科研"研究生科技创新基金"资助项目(CDJXS11021118)
关键词
创业投资
互补效应
双边道德风险
股权分配
Venture Capital
Complementary Effects
Bilateral Moral Hazard
Equity Allocation
