摘要
从村镇银行特征出发,构建银监会与村镇银行信贷经理人之间的博弈模型,求解出村镇银行信贷经理人违规放贷概率的函数,分析各因素的影响机制,得出村镇银行的监管范式是实施威慑性外部人监管。
Based on the features of Village Bank, this paper constructs a Game Mode between the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the credit manager of Village Bank, to work out the Proba- bility Function of credit managers illegal lending and to analyze the influential mechanisms of various fac- tors so that we can conclude a fact that the regulatory paradigm of Village Bank is implementing a deter- rent external supervision.
出处
《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2012年第4期82-87,共6页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社科基金项目(10BJY055)
广东省社科基金项目(GD10CYJ11)
广东省高校人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(09JDXM79011)
关键词
村镇银行
金融监管
银监会
village bank
financial regulation
theoretical analysis