自由现金流与在职消费——基于所有制和公司治理的实证研究

Free Cash Flow and Position-related Consumption: Empirical Study Based on the Ownership and Corporate Governance

自由现金流量是企业高管可以自由支配的现金流量。自由现金流量越多,企业高管越有可能出现损害所有者利益的行为,过度在职消费,从而最终导致企业绩效下降。本文选取2006-2010年沪市上市A股企业数据为样本,实证检验我国上市公司自由现金流和在职消费程度的关系,并进一步考察不同的所有制性质和公司治理水平对自由现金流和在职消费之间关系的影响。为完善公司治理结构、合理约束代理人行为提供政策建议。

Free cash flow（FCF） is the cash flow freely dominated by corporate executives. The more free cash flow corporate has, the more likely corporate executives are to impair the interest of the owners. This may lead to position-related excessive consumption and uhimately lead to performance decline. This paper selects the 2006-2010 data of Shanghai-listed companies, empirically tests the relationship between free cash flow and the degree of position-related consumption in China＇s listed companies, and further tests the ownership＇ s and the level of corporate governance＇ s impact on the relationship between FCF and position-related consumption. Finally, this paper provides policy suggestions for improving corporate governance structure and constraining agent behavior reasonably.