国有企业高管参政议政、政治激励与过度投资

Political Participation of Executives in State-owned Enterprises,Political Incentive and Overinvestment

本文以2004-2009年间A股国有上市公司为研究样本,考察了高管参政议政对公司过度投资水平的影响。结果表明,高管参政议政能够显著降低自由现金流的过度投资,而在制度环境越差的地区,高管参政议政与自由现金流过度投资之间的负向关系越强。上述结论说明,国有企业高管参政议政体现了政治激励的作用。本文的研究意义在于:与已有文献多关注薪酬激励不同,本文以高管参政议政这一普遍现象为切入点,考察了政治激励对国有上市公司治理机制的作用;与此同时,中国的国有企业改革一直备受关注,本文的结论表明,高管政治激励能够有效地改善国有上市公司的治理机制,这一发现为提高国有企业投资效率、规范国有企业投资体制提供了有益的政策参考。

Using state - owned listed companies from 2004 to 2009 as sample, this paper studies the effect of executive＇ s political participation on the overinvestment of state - owned listed companies. We find that executive＇ s political participation has a significant effect on reducing the overinvestment of free cash flow and that the worse the institutional environment is, the stronger the effect is. These results suggest that executive＇ s political participation implies the political incentive. From the view of executive＇ s political participation, this paper studies the effect of political incentive on the corporate governance, which is different from the literature focusing on the compensational incentive. Meanwhile, the reform of stated - owned companies has garnered particular attention, our study provides useful policy suggestions to enhance the investment efficiency of stated - owned companies and standardize investment system of state - owned companies.