CEO任期、继任来源与管理层激励的动态调整

CEO Tenure,Succession Resource and Dynamic Adjustment of Managerial Incentive

任期是识别经理人能力的重要标志。我们从CEO任期的角度探究了其与薪酬激励之间的动态调整关系,并考察了不同继任来源CEO之间的差异。研究发现,CEO任期与货币薪酬、股权激励及薪酬差距之间均呈倒U型关系:在货币薪酬方面,当任期达到8年时,CEO货币薪酬达到最大值;在薪酬差距方面,当任期5～7年时,管理层内部薪酬差距达到最大值;尽管继任来源对上述两方面不存在显著影响,但在股权激励方面,外部继任CEO达到最大值所需任期却远大于内部继任CEO。这些结论对管理层权力效应、认知效应和动态契约效应提供了有力的证明,但是对于职业生涯假设的支持并不显著。

Tenure is an important indicator which recognizes executive＇s qualifications. The paper has explored the relationship between CEO tenure and compensation, further examining the relationship based on different succession resource. Our results indicate that the relationship between CEO tenure and compensation incentives （including cash compensation, equity incentive and the pay gap ） shows an inverted Ushape： cash compensation will maximize when CEO tenure equals to eight years; top managementteam pay gap will maximize when CEO tenure equals to five to seven years; succession resource has little effects on these two relationships except equity incentive, successive from outside needs much longer tenure than successive from inside. These conclusions provide strong evidence for the managerial power effect, the learning effect, and the dynamic contracting effect, not remarkably supporting the career concern effect.