委托人公平偏好下国企高管的最优激励组合

On Optimal Incentive Combination of Top Executives in State-owned Enterprises from the Perspective of Principal Fairness Preference

文章基于国企委托人公平偏好的性质,将公平偏好模型拓展至隐性激励和显性激励并行的环境,研究了国企高管的最优激励组合。结果表明,为了降低高管收入分配不公平给政府带来的效用损失,同时避免因显性薪酬减少引起的效率损失,政府主管部门倾向于用隐性激励来替代显性激励,且用于替代的隐性合约随着这种公平偏好强度的增加而大幅增加。这表明使用隐性合约有利于在兼顾激励效率的基础上缓解政府的社会公平约束。但隐性合约的作用受限于政府主管部门对高管贡献的主观评估能力,评估能力越低,政府薪酬规制政策的效果越差。

Based on the fairne.ss preference of SOEs＇ principals, this paper studies the optimal incentive combination of top executives in stateowned enter prises by an extended model with explicit and implicit incentives. The results show that, in order to reduce the utility losses caused by unfair income distribution of top executives and avoid the efficiency losses begotten by the decrease in explicit remuneration, the government authorities tend to provide implicit incentives in stead of explicit incentives, and as this fairness preference strengthens, the implicit contracts as the substitutes for explicit incentives significantly increase. These re suits reflect that the implicit contracts are conducive to easing the social fairness constraints based on showing consideration for incentive efficiency. But this func tion of implicit contracts is affected by the government authorities subjective abili ty of assessing top executive contribution, that is to say the weaker this ability is, the worse the effect of government remuneration regulation policy is.