摘要
中小企业在国民经济中占有重要地位,但其融资难的问题却普遍存在,这无疑极大阻碍其发展。本文针对中小企业与银行间的关系,分析了贷前分开均衡和合并均衡存在的条件,以及贷后从银行考查与否和企业骗贷与否两方面给出了银企在多次信贷中的复制动态过程。并探讨了建立新型银企关系的条件,为银行在完全市场条件下的贷前信号博弈和有限理性下的贷后进化博弈中,如何有效规避信贷风险提出了改进思路。
Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in national economy,however their difficult in applying loads retards their development.This paper establishes a signaling game model and an evolutional game model respectively due to different relationship between SMEs and banks before and after the act of credit.Then it solves the conditions for equilibrium for the first model,and makes a duplicated analysis on the game theoretical model utilizing the evolutional game theory.Finally,this paper discussed conditions of construction of new SME-bank relationship style,and puts forward some policy suggestions for banks to reduce credit risk,based on the above analysis.
出处
《价值工程》
2012年第34期132-134,共3页
Value Engineering
关键词
信贷市场
信号博弈
进化博弈
credit market
signaling game
evolutional game
