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试论风险投资退出方式的相机抉择 被引量:1

On the Choice of Venture Capital Exit Mode
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摘要 风险投资退出方式直接决定相关主体收益。本文构建了以效用为标准的退出方式选择指标体系,在此基础上比较了上市和并购两种退出方式,并分析了退出方式的相机抉择机理。主要结论是:企业潜在价值越大,企业家持股比例越高,风险投资越倾向于以上市方式退出;退出方式的选择是相机的,上市退出和并购退出不存在绝对的优劣,风险投资应根据外部环境和企业的具体情况选择最优的退出方式。 Venture capital exit modes directly decide the interest of related entities. The paper establishes the selective index system of exit mode based on the standard of utility maximization, compares the exit modes of IPO and M&A, and analyzes the selective mechanism of exit modes. The conclusions are as follows: Firstly, the greater the potential value of the enterprise is and the higher the entrepreneur holds stake, the stronger the tendency of the venture capital exit is in the way of IPO. Secondly, the choice of venture cap- itals exit modes is decided according to the circumstance. There is no absolute advantage and disadvantage between IPO and M&A, so it is reasonable for venture capital to choose the best exit mode in accordance with the external environment and the situations of the enterprises.
作者 李璐 彭海城
出处 《西部金融》 2012年第10期67-70,96,共5页 West China Finance
关键词 风险投资 退出方式 企业价值 venture capital exit mode enterprise value
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