网络效应下优势厂商的兼并行为选择

The Dominant Enterprise How to Merge with Network Effects

基于Salop模型,分析了存在网络效应的市场中具有成本优势的厂商如何进行兼并,兼并后是否保留被兼并品牌,以及兼并行为对社会福利的影响。结果表明,在网络效应较弱并且优势厂商的成本优势也不明显时,厂商倾向于放弃被兼并品牌的兼并,优势很大时则会选择不兼并。网络效应的增强会使得优势厂商更倾向于兼并且保留被兼并品牌,并且不论网络效应的大小,保留被兼并品牌的兼并会增加社会福利,放弃被兼并品牌的兼并会减少社会福利。

Based on the Salop model, the paper analyzes the dominant enterprise that has the cost advantage how to choose merger, whether to keep the merged brand and the behavior how to affect social welfare in the market with network effects. The results show that if the network effects and cost advantage both are weak, the dominant enterprise tends to merge but abandon the merged brand. If the network effects become stronger the dominant enterprise inclines to merge and reserves the merged brand. No matter how strong or how weak are the network effects, to retain merged brand will increase social welfare, and to abandon the merged brands will reduce social welfare.