地方官员的晋升逻辑:中国地级市市长的实证研究

Logic of Political Turnover:Evidence from Prefectural Mayors in China

本文运用中国地级市1996年至2010年的主要经济信息和历任821位市长个人详细信息的面板数据,考察了中国地级市市长的晋升机制。我们发现如下结果:(1)纵向来看,中国各级官员的升迁并不存在一个全国统一的晋升机制。与省级官员面临强大的经济绩效激励不同,经济绩效对地级市市长的晋升有着负的但有限的影响;(2)横向来看,地级市市长的晋升机制在区域之间存在一定的差异。与中、西部地区不同,经济绩效对东部地区市长的晋升有着正的但有限的影响;(3)与年龄类似,市长的任期对其晋升可能性存在着非线性的影响。当使用其他经济绩效指标进行检验时,我们的研究结论仍然成立。

Using a large panel turnover dataset of 821 prefectural mayors in China between 1996 and 2010 ,this paper ex- amines the logic of political turnover for prefectural mayors in China. An ordered probit model of mayor turnover suggests that： 1. The economic performance of cities has negative but limited substantive impact on mayors＇ promotion or removal from office, which differs from the result of provincial level. Hence a nationwide unified mechanism does NOT exist;2. For the East of Chi- na, the economic performance of cities has positive but limited impact on turnover, but it is not the case for the Middle and West of China. Therefore there does EXIST regional differences ;3. As Mayors＇s age ,tenure has a nonlinear effect on turnover. Our findings are robust with different economic performance indicators.