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薪酬分配与企业增长复杂系统仿真模型研究

Study on Complex Systems Simulation Model of Enterprise Growth Based on the Salary Distribution
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摘要 为了研究薪酬分配制度是如何通过对企业员工的激励来影响企业经济增长的,从薪酬分配角度出发,考虑企业员工的异质性、部门异质性及主体之间的交互作用,利用复杂自适应系统建模方法,构建了基于薪酬分配的企业增长复杂系统仿真模型。为了检验模型的正确性,设计了态度激励与绩效激励两个仿真实验。通过仿真实验发现:(1)在两种激励机制中,社会偏好越大的员工对企业的贡献表现较优;(2)绩效激励对社会偏好较弱的员工的激励程度远大于社会偏好较优的员工;(3)企业在不同的发展阶段、不同的市场条件下应设定相应的部门贡献系数;(4)态度激励是一个保护弱者的激励机制,更适应于公共服务事业。该模型研究为薪酬分配体制的相关研究提供了方法和手段。 In order to study how the distribution system affects economic through the incentive to employees growth, this article, from the perspective of the pay distribution, given the heterogeneity of employees, departmental heterogeneity, the use of complex adaptive system modeling method, build businesses salary growth based on the analysis of model. To test the model is correct, the paper designs two simulation experiments and performance incentives. The result shows that : ( 1 ) Two kinds of incentive mechanisms, the greater social preferences of employees perform better to corporate contri- butions . (2) The weaker performance incentives for employees of social preferences is far greater than the motivation of social preferences. (3) Enterprises in different stages of development, different market conditions should set correspond- ing sector's contribution coefficient. (4) The attitude of the incentive is an incentive mechanism to protect the weak, which is adapted to public service. The model distribution system for the remuneration of the relevant research provides a method and means.
出处 《科技管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第22期135-140,共6页 Science and Technology Management Research
基金 国家自然基金项目"可再生能源总量目标分配机制及其有效性检验"(71073095) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目"公益项目建设中相关利益主体特征分析与冲突协调机制研究"(10YJC630161) 重庆市教委重大项目"基于移动式的经管研究生实验教学理论 方法与平台研究"(Yjg110107)
关键词 薪酬分配 企业增长 复杂系统 经济学仿真 异质性 salary distribution enterprise growth complex systems economic simulation heterogeneity
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