过密化视阈下的反腐倡廉制度建设

The Construction of Anti-Corruption System from the Perspective of Institutional Involution

在反腐倡廉实践中,包括纪检监察部门在内的各级机构制定了大量相关制度,构建了庞杂的反腐倡廉制度体系。然而,繁多的制度并未有效堵塞权力运行过程中的漏洞,甚至出现了"制度越多,腐败越严重"的现象。反腐倡廉建设领域存在"制度增长与制度的边际效用递减同时存在"的制度过密化问题,其原因包括历史、现实、基层创制冲动、绩效强化等多方面的因素。建议从加强反腐倡廉制度建设的顶层设计、提高反腐倡廉制度科学化水平、提升反腐倡廉制度执行力、做好现有制度的梳理等方面入手,逐步走出制度过密化的困境,切实发挥制度在反腐倡廉建设中的决定性作用。

The agents such as supervisory offices have constructed a complicated anti-corruption system that includes many rules and regulations. However, these institutions don＇t work effectively;and the worse thing is that ＂more institutions, more corruptions＂. In this paper, the authors raise a new theoretical hy- pothesis called anti-corruption institutional involution and validate the hypothesis by empirical approach. It reveals that the institutional involution is a real problem in the field of anti-corruption construction, and that the institutions of anti-corruption increases but the marginal benefit decrease on the same time. The reason that caused this status is analyzed from the aspects of historical, realistic, impulsion of grass roots and benefit pressures. The dilemma may be overcome by enhancing of the top design of anti-corruption system, improving the scientific level of the institutions, enhancing executive force of anti-corruption sys- tem, and carding the existing system. The system may play a decisive role on anti-corruption.