期刊文献+

政府调控下竞争性逆向供应链合作谈判 被引量:4

Competitive Reverse Supply Chain Collaborative Negotiation under Government Regulation
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摘要 建立了多个制造商与多个回收商组成的竞争性逆向供应链的三阶段博弈决策模型,构建制造商与回收商间不对称信息Nash合作谈判框架,在财政收支平衡基础上以社会福利最大化为目标,利用逆向归纳法求出合作谈判的最优均衡。最后通过算例分析发现,绿色税率的提高会降低制造商的讨价还价能力和提高回收商的讨价还价能力,但税率过高反而会降低回收商的利润。 This paper studies two-echelon reverse supply chain consisting of multi-manufacturer and multi-collector, which considered government levies green taxes on manufacturer and provides financial subsidies for collector. The asymmetrical Nash bargaining game agendas was constructed. Utilized the backward induction, the equilibrium solutions to cooperative a- greements is provided under social welfare maximization and financial revenue and payment balance. A numerical experiment was presented to prove that green taxes can weaken manufacturer bargaining power and enhance collector bargaining power, and excess green taxes has counter-effect on collector profit.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第11期63-66,84,共5页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71171002) 安徽省高校省级自然科学重点项目(KJ2011A033) 教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(10YJA630042)
关键词 逆向供应链 政府调控 合作谈判 Nash博弈 reverse supply chain government regulation collaborative negotiation Nash game
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献94

共引文献732

同被引文献56

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