独立董事、信息成本与公司绩效——基于信息不对称视角的实证分析

Independent Directors,Information Cost and Corporate Performance:An Empirical Study from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry

本文利用2002—2004年我国证监会强制上市公司提高独立董事比例期间的经验数据,在控制内生性问题的前提下,实证检验了上市公司的信息环境对独立董事与公司绩效之间关系的影响。结果表明,上市公司的信息获取成本在独立董事比例与公司绩效的关系中起负向调节作用:信息成本较低时,独立董事比例与公司绩效显著正相关;在信息成本较高时,独立董事比例与公司绩效显著负相关。从而说明,最优的董事结构应该与上市公司的信息环境相匹配。强制提高独立董事的比例未必能改善董事会的治理效率,促进公司绩效的提升。

By using the data of Chinese listed companies in the period of 2002--2004 when Chinese Security Regulatory Commission forced them to increase the proportion of independent directors, this paper empirically examines the impact of the information environment of listed companies on the relationship between independent director and corporate performance. The resuIt shows that information cost acts as a negative mediating factor between independent director and corporate performance. When information cost is relatively low, the increase of the proportion of independent director could lead to the improvement of corporate performance; however, when information cost is relatively high, the increase of the proportion of independent director might quack corporate performance. It is implied that the optimal structure of the board should match with the information environment of listed companies. Increasing the proportion of independent director by force might not enable to improve the efficiency of the governance of the Board.