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面对促销期的供应链生产销售微分对策研究 被引量:2

Differential Production and Marketing Games for the Supply Chain under Promotional Demand
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摘要 针对一个制造商与一个销售商在动态变化状态下的生产与定价决策问题,本文构建被动接受市场动态模型和主动投入努力动态模型,进行Stackelberg博弈和合作优化,再利用微分对策求解出生产量、批发价、零售价和投入努力值的最优策略。在促销期的一段时间内,以供应链利润最大化为前提,应用模型求解,企业可以动态选择最优生产量、定价及投入努力值,从而获得自身利润的增加并促进企业在整个供应链上实现可持续发展。 With the development of economic globalization and technology, enterprises are facing complex and dynamic competition environment, and the competition among enterprises varies with supply chains. Although manufacturers are used to focus on resources integration, they are gradually resorting to the collaboration of upstream and downstream enterprises. Through the collaboration of production and distribution, enterprises can reduce costs, improve customer service and enhance the overall competitiveness of the supply chain. At present, the research on supply chain collaborative optimization often focuses on static or relatively static state which means one order or one production. There is much less research on dynamic collaborative optimization for a period of time. However, the long-term optimal result is not the same as the instantaneous optimal result. The dynamic market changes have important implications for enterprises, and the dynamic state is more realistic. This paper focuses mainly on the optimal production and pricing strategies when a manufacturer and a seller make promotional decisions under dynamic state during one period time. In the changing market environment, a manufacturer needs to make production and pricing strategies according to the variable demand. Through the collaboration of production, marketing and other aspects between upstream and downstream enterprises, a manufacturer can dynamically choose the optimal strategies to improve the profit of its own and the entire supply chain. In this paper, the supply chain's collaborative production and marketing strategies and models under market changes are proposed. Focusing on the production and pricing decision problems of a manufacturer and a seller under dynamic state, this paper constructs dynamic models of passive acceptance of the market. The optimal value of production, wholesale price, retail price and effort rate are obtained through cooperative game and Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is considered as the leader and the seller as the follower. An enterprise can use these models to solve problems and maximize profit for the entire supply chain. Enterprises can dynamically choose the optimal production, price and effort rate in order to increase their profits and achieve sustainab^le deve^topment in the entire supply chain. In summary, the retail price is lower than the wholesale price in the promotion period. In addition, the supply chain's profit in the cooperative mode is always greater than the totat profit of the manufacturer and the seller in the Stackelberg game, and the production quantity increases when the retail price is decreased. Lastly, the manufacturer and the seller will gain more profits when seller plays active roles in participation.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第4期65-70,共6页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 北京市哲学社会科学规划重点资助项目(08ABJa236)
关键词 供应链 微分对策 STACKELBERG博弈 定价 投入努力值 supply chain differential game Stackelberg game pricing strategy effort rate
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