基于道德风险视角的资本类逆周期监管工具的比较分析

Comparison of Capital Counter-cyclical Regulation Tools from Perspective of Moral Hazard

2007—2009年的全球金融风暴使监管者最终认识到宏观审慎管理的重要性,其主要目的是缓解顺周期问题。然而,我们认为宏观审慎管理可以兼顾"大而不能倒"的金融机构引发的道德风险问题。本文对这一问题做了初步性的探索,结论为:时间可变的资本充足率不能很好地解决"大而不能倒"的金融机构所面临的道德风险问题;或有资本可以部分解决金融机构的道德风险问题;救助保险基金能够很好地解决道德风险问题。

Regulators finally recognize the importance of macro-prudential regulation after 2007--2009 global financial turrnoil, its main purpose is to ease the procyclical issue. However, we believe that macro-prudential regulation can deal with the moral hazard problem caused by ＂too big to fail＂ financial institutions, the article makes a preliminary exploration. We conclude that the time varying capital requirement can not solve the moral hazard problem; contingent capital can partially solve the problem of moral hazard ＂bailout＂ insurance fimd is a good solution to the problem of moral hazard.