摘要
从2001年的"安然丑闻"到2007年的金融危机,美国信用评级行业高度集中的市场结构一直广受诟病。许多学者指出,竞争不足是导致信用评级结果缺乏准确性和可靠性的主要原因,监管者应在评级行业中引入竞争机制,从而打破行业垄断、提高行业效率。然而,也有部分学者对此持反对态度,认为"声誉机制"可以替代竞争机制,对评级机构的违规行为施加有效的约束,而增强竞争将是弊大于利。为了打破美国信用评级行业的自由竞争悖论,监管者应对新加入的评级机构进行扶持,进一步提高评级行为的透明度,并增强评级机构的法律责任。
The credit rating industry in the United States has been receiving significant criticism since the "Enron Scandal" in 2001 and the financial crisis in 2007. Many scholars believe that the lack of accuracy and accountability in credit rating is caused by insufficient competition and therefore calling for greater competitive regulation. However, other scholars claim that the "reputational mechanism" could replace the competitive regulation as an effective disciplinary force on rating agency' s misbehavior and excessive competition will do more harm than good. In order to solve the competitive regulation paradox in the credit rating industry, regulators should formulate policies to encourage new entrants and enhance market transparency. Furthermore, the rating agencies should take greater legal responsibilities and be duely punished for malfunctions.
出处
《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期87-94,共8页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
信用评级
NRSROs
竞争机制
声誉机制
credit rating
NRSROs
competitive mechanism
reputational mechanism