制度偏好对劳资谈判能力与契约剩余配置的影响——兼论增加劳动者契约剩余份额的制度改革

On the Effect of Institution Preference on Labor and Capital Negotiation Ability and Contract Residual Allocation——An Institutional Reform of Increasing Labor Contract Residual Share

对劳资契约剩余占有的不均是初次分配中劳动者报酬水平较低的重要表现。不完全劳资契约条件下,对剩余权利的占有带来剩余收益。劳动者获取契约剩余收益的多寡取决于占有剩余权利的多少,而剩余权利的配置取决于劳资双方谈判能力的高低。既定的劳动供求关系下,劳资双方谈判能力的高低主要受制于一定的制度环境,它和制度偏好成正比。本文主要从制度偏好对谈判能力和劳资契约剩余分配的作用机制入手,阐明我国劳动者讨价还价能力较低、契约剩余份额较少的主要原因,为提高初次分配中劳动者报酬水平提供新的思路。

The imbalanced distribution of residual revenue of labor contract is a main manifesta- tion of lower labor share in primary distribution. Under the condition of incomplete labor contract, it brings about residual income to the occupation of residual rights. And the residual income share is determined by the occupied residual rights, and the allocation of residual rights is determined by the negotiation ability of both labor and capital party. Under the given labor supply and demand rela- tionship, the negotiation ability is mainly restricted by institutional environment, and it is propor- tional to institutional preferenee. In this paper, I make an analysis on the function mechanism of in- stitutional preference on negotiation ability and residual allocation of labor and capital contract, and illustrate the reasons of lower negotiation ability of bargaining and smaller residual share of the la- bors, !orovidin~： new idea for increasin~ labor payment level in Drimarv allcmatlnn