农产品区域公用品牌的经济学解析:一个基于声誉的信号传递模型

The Economic Analysis on the Regional Public Brand of Agricultural Products:A Signaling Game Model Based on Reputation

虽然当前农产品区域公用品牌建设在我国开展得如火如荼,但理论界对此尚存在争议。文章通过构建一个基于声誉的信号传递模型,对农产品市场引入区域公用品牌的价值进行解析。模型分析结果表明农产品生产者主要以户为单位,经营规模小、注重短期收益,同时消费者对品牌农产品的支付意愿不高,导致我国农产品市场品牌农产品供给不足,农产品市场由于信息不对称而陷入低质量均衡。因此,为保障农产品市场品牌的有效供给,需要政府对农产品品牌建设给予扶持。与对新注册农产品商标进行补贴相比,扶持农产品区域公用品牌建设是一种更优的制度安排。

In spite of the rigorous development of regional public brand of agricultural products in our country, there is still much controversy about it in the academic circles. In this paper, a signaling game model based on reputation is used to analyze the value of the regional public brand introduced to agricultural markets. In our country, agricultural production is organized mainly ac- cording to the household unit, with a small scale and much concern for short-term gains. Meanwhile the consumer is not willing to afford the high price for Brand Agricultural Products, which leads to the lack of enthusiasm about building agricultural product brands. As a result the agricultural products market slumps into low quality equilibrium because of asymmetric information. Therefore, in order to ensure the effective supply of the brand agricultural products market, the government should provide support for the brand construction of agricultural products. Compared with providing direct subsidies for each agricultural product trademark regis- tered recently, it is a much better institutional arrangement to construct regional public brands in the agricultural product market.