闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策研究

Study on Bi-channel Decision-making in Closed-loop Supply Chain Environment

基于Stackelberg主从博弈研究了闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策问题。结果表明:当顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较高水平或者服务弹性处于较低水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并自己主动制定网络直销渠道的零售价格;反之,则应完全通过传统零售渠道来销售产品。而在顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较低水平而服务弹性处于中等水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并跟随零售商的零售价格来制定网络直销渠道的零售价格。同时,制造商应努力提高顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度,以主动提升在服务弹性较小时的最大利润。同时零售商的回收努力程度与产品批发价格负相关,制造商如果希望零售商提高回收努力程度以提升企业形象,应控制降低产品批发价格。

In this paper, based on the Stac kelberg master-slave game, we studied the hi-channel decision-making in a closed-loop suppy chain and found that with high level customer acceptance of the network directsales channel or low level service flexibility, the manufacturer should introduce the network direct-sales channel and dominate the retail price in the channel; on the contrary, it should relied on the traditional retail channel. With low levd customer acceptance of the network direct- sales channel or intermediate levd service flexihility, the manufacturer should introduce the network direct-sales channel and decide on the retail price in the channel according to that of the retailer. Meanwhile, in order to proactivdy improve the maximum profit of less flexible services, the manufacturer should strive to improve the level of cutomer acceptance of the n etwork direct-sales channel and the recycling effort of the manufacturer was negatively related to the wholesale price of the product.