亚里士多德论“最高善”的两条路径及其局限

Aristotle's Two Approaches to“the Highest Good”and their Limitations

本文考察了亚里士多德对"善"和"最高善"(人类幸福)所做的说明。在《尼各马可伦理学》中,他一方面将"善"界定为人类欲望的目标,据此确定各种善事物之间的排序并最终推导出最高善的存在;另一方面将"善"表述为人类特定功能的施展,由此说明良好地实现并展示这种功能的行为被认为是具有美德和高贵的人类行为,进而指出人类幸福在于灵魂合乎美德的活动。本文试图表明:较之于柏拉图的善理念,亚里士多德所采取的这种具有双重路径的证明模式在阐明"善是什么"这个问题上具有较大优势,但在回答"最高善(幸福)是什么"的时候则无法摆脱论证路线本身所带来的局限,后者导致他对最高善的设想和说明出现某种张力。这种张力表明:仅仅从人类的现实活动层面来设想一个具有超越性的"最高善"的思路是有局限的。

This paper discuses Aristotle's search for'the good'and'the highest good'.In The Nicomachean Ethics,on the one hand Aristotle regards'the good'as human desire and gives an order of all good things and the existence of the highest good;on the other hand,he holds that'the good'is an expression of special human functions and human happiness lies in good things that satisfy his soul.This paper holds that compared with Plato's concept of'the good',Aristotle's two approaches to'the good'is better but his explanation of'the highest good'is limited due to the tension in his explanation at the level of human activities.