摘要
休谟在《人性论》第三卷中专门讨论了道德区别的来源问题,这是苏格兰启蒙运动中伦理学的一个基本问题。作为苏格兰常识学派的一员,休谟对此问题的探讨表现出继承性,认为道德区别来源于情感而非理性,但其思想之价值更表现为他的道德感与动机紧密相关,说明了道德感如何刺激起道德的行为,消解了应然与实然的断裂。他对此问题的独特回答可以通过与哈奇森的比较表现出来。亦可看出,休谟的道德学说与后世功利主义伦理学有着本质不同;而对当代情感主义伦理学的批评也不适于休谟等道德情感主义者。
In the beginning of the third volume of Treatise of Human Nature,David Hume discusses the issue of where the moral distinctions derived from.It's also a basic issue in Scottish Enlightenment ethics.As a member of Scottish School of Common Sense,Hume thinks that moral distinctions originate from affections instead of irrationality,reflecting the inheritance.However,his contribution to this issue is shown as that the moral sense is closely related to motivation.He explains how the moral sense stimulates the moral actions,dispelling the confliction between "to be" and "ought to be".His unique view is explicitly distinct from Hutcheson,and essentially different from Utilitarianism ethics.The critique of modern emotionalism ethics cannot apply to the moral emotionalism like Hume's.
出处
《华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期13-18,共6页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
道德区别
道德感
休谟
哈奇森
moral sense
moral distinctions
Hume
Hutcheson