摘要
文中探究了在一个由单一零售商、单一制造商构成的二级再制造闭环供应链中,制造商为领导者,零售商为追随者;同时基于EOL产品的供给函数分为可确定的线性部分以及不可确定的随机部分的条件下,依据Stackelberg二阶段博弈理论,建立相关数学模型,分析了在完全信息和不完全信息下再制造闭环供应链中EOL产品的最优回收价格以及制造商的最优回收转移支付价格。从而对企业再制造闭环供应链管理的实践提供一定的借鉴意义。
This paper discusses a two- echlon closed -loop supply chain formed by a single manufacturer- single retailer, In our models with remanufacturing, the manufacturer has sufficient channel power over the retailer to act as a Stackelberg leader. At the same time based on EOL product supply function curve can be divided into the linear part and the uncertain random part,and we establish a mathematical model to analyse the optimal recovery price and transfer price under the complete and incomplete information of remanufacturing closed - loop supply chain. Furthermore, it meets supply chain optimization with reducing the supply chain double marginal price effect and achieves supply chain coordination.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2012年第11期108-109,55,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
