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项目复杂性、联合风险投资结构与项目成功率 被引量:7

Project complexity,the structure of venture capital syndication,and the success probability of projects
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摘要 基于项目特征和风险投资家的双重视角,建立了创业企业项目的两阶段融资序列模型,分析了联合风险投资结构下风险投资家的努力水平决策及其均衡解,研究了项目复杂性、联合风险投资结构与项目成功率的关系,研究表明:联合风险投资这种契约结构使得高成本的风险投资家提供低水平的努力,低成本的风险投资家提供高水平的努力;项目复杂性越低,所需要的异质性专长就越少,越有可能采取单独投资。项目复杂性越高,所需要的异质性专长就越多,越有可能采取联合风险投资;联合风险投资结构与风险投资家的努力水平交互影响项目成功率。 A new theoretic model of two- stages Venture Capital (VC) finance sequence for the entrepreneurial firms project from dual perspective is set up based on project characteristics and venture capitalists, the effort level of venture capitalists and their equilibrium solution within syndicate financing modes are analyzed, the relationship among project complexity, the structure of VC syndication, and the success probability of projects is studied. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn : ( 1 ) Due to the contract structure of VC syndication, a low level of effort is provided by the venture capitalist with a high - cost VC, and a high level of effort is provided by the venture capitalist with a low - cost VC. (2) Firms having less complex projects are more likely to seek financing from a single VC, because it needs less heterogeneous expertise, firms having more complex projects are more likely to seek financing from a VC syndicate, because it needs more heterogeneous expertise. (3) Both the structure of VC syndication and the effort level of venture capitalists influence the success probability of projects interactively.
出处 《科研管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第12期94-103,共10页 Science Research Management
基金 国家教育部博士点基金项目(20106118110012) 起止时间:2011.01.01-2013.12.31 国家自然科学基金项目(71172201) 起止时间:2012.01.01-2015.12.31
关键词 项目复杂性 风险投资 努力水平 联合风险投资结构 项目成功率 project complexity VC effort level structure of venture capital syndication project success probabili
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