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无线接入网中移动节点间基于博弈的交互方案 被引量:2

A Game-Based Interaction Scheme among Mobile Nodes in Wireless Access Networks
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摘要 为抑制无线接入网环境下移动节点相互中继数据时的作弊行为,提出一种由邻居节点实施惩罚和由系统实施惩罚的博弈转发交互方案,其特点是:充分利用了接入网中数据流向特征,考虑了理性的移动节点对系统的贡献和期望的回报,以降低作弊者预期收益和利用其对后继惩罚的恐惧来抑制作弊.前者能以较小的惩罚参数达到较好地抑制节点作弊行为的目的,但在作弊者能频繁更换邻居的情况下难以兑现惩罚;而后者则使作弊者无法逃脱惩罚,但它需要很大惩罚参数才能完全杜绝作弊动机.通过仿真与分析,得出了将两者结合的合理参数设置,能够既不惩罚过度又能有效降低作弊发生率和提高报文的成功投递率. In order to curb cheating behaviors of mobile nodes in wireless access networks when they relay data each other, a forwarding policy game scheme is presented in this paper. It consists of a method based on the enforcement of punishments by neighboring nodes and a method based on the enforcement of punishments by the system. The scheme makes good use of the data flow direction in wireless access networks, takes account of the rational nodes' contribution to the system and the desire for future return, and suppresses the selfish nodes' cheating behavior through reducing their future payoff expectations and exploiting their fear of punishments. The former method in the scheme can achieve a better result of restraining cheating behaviors with a less value of punishment parameter, but it is difficult to punish successfully the cheating nodes when they frequently replace their neighboring nodes. Although the latter method completely prevents cheating motivation with a more value of punishment parameter, it can make cheating nodes have no way to escape being punished. In simulation and analysis, the reasonable parameter values are obtained through integrating the two methods, which can both moderately punish the cheating nodes and effectively reduce the cheating occurrence ratio and improve the successful packet delivery ratio.
出处 《计算机研究与发展》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第12期2539-2548,共10页 Journal of Computer Research and Development
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(61272494 60873082 60903058 61073104) 湖南省自然科学基金项目(10JJ3087)
关键词 无线接入网 转发策略 博弈 作弊行为 惩罚 wireless access network forwarding strategy game cheating behavior punishment
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参考文献17

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共引文献29

同被引文献35

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