行政问责与政策行为从众:“十一五”节能目标实施进度地区间差异考察

Administrative Accountability and Bandwagoning in Policy Implementation: Regional Variations in Energy Saving Policy Implementation,2006-2009

研究引入"政策行为从众"的概念,并通过实证证明,作为超常规政治激励手段的行政问责制,会在不同类型的政策执行主体中产生"政策行为从众"的行为模式,而不能在整体上提高所有政策执行主体的执行水平。具体的来说,政策实施初期执行进度较慢的省份将在行政问责的压力下强化政策实施力度以实现赶超,但初期执行进度较快的省份将在后期主动弱化实施力度。不同执行的主体的"从众"行为将在整体上减弱行政问责制的政策效果,并在客观上导致节能约束性指标打折扣。本文建议应在完善问责制的基础上,综合采用财政与税收奖励等激励性手段,提高地方对节能减排等国家政策的"自发性"实施意愿,构建自我强化的政策实施长效机制。

In this paper, we investigate regional variations in annual provincial progress in achieving the energy saving goal set up in the Eleventh Five Year Plan, thereby assessing the effectiveness of the administrative accountability system in promoting local implementation. Adopting the concept of bandwagon in policy implementation, we conduct empirical analysis and demonstrate that the administrative accountability system, being an irregular political incentive mechanism, may induce bandwagoning behavior among agents of policy implementation rather than promoting overall improvement of implementation outcomes. Specifically, under political pressure from the administrative accountability system, provinces that lag behind earlier in policy implementation will significantly improve its implementation behavior later in order to catch up with other provinces; however, provinces pioneering earlier will reduce their efforts due to lessened political pressure to them. As a result, such bandwagoning behavior will reduce overall effectiveness of the administrative accountability system in achieving best policy outcomes. We suggest that, in addition to the administrative accountability system, government should disaggregate national goals in energy saving and emission reduction based upon provincial conditions, enhance other policy instruments （ such as tax and fiscal rewards） , and build a self-enforcing mechanism to increase local officials＇ willingness in energy saving and emission reduction.