风险投资中的收益分配与激励机制探究——基于信息不对称下委托代理模型的分析

Exploration on Income Distribution and Incentive Mechanism in Venture Investment——Based on the Analysis of Principal-agent Model under Information Asymmetry

在信息不对称条件下,风险投资市场中的风险投资者与风险投资家会形成委托代理关系进而会导致逆向选择与道德风险问题的出现。从减少信息不对称和促使委托人与代理人双方收益趋向一致的角度出发,建立了一套分析风险投资者与风险投资家收益分配机制模型,根据模型分析得出收益分配的最佳方案,提出了更加完善的委托代理风险防范措施和激励机制,以解决风险投资者无法克服信息不对称所带来的逆向选择及道德风险等一系列实际问题,并在帮助风险投资者约束风险投资家的行为的基础上使自己的收益最大化,从而促进风险投资市场更加繁荣和健康发展。

The venture investors and venture capitalists in the venture investment market will form a principal-agent relationship under information asymmetry, which will further cause adverse selection and moral hazard. In order to reduce information asymmetry as well as conflict of interests between the principals and agents, the author establishes a set of models to analyze the mechanism for income disllibution between venture investors and venture capitalists. According to the analysis through the models, the author finds out the best way for income distribution, advances more optimized measures to prevent risks in a principal-agent relationship as well as the incentive mechanism so as to solve a series of problems such as the adverse selection and moral hazard due to the information asymmetry which are hard to resolve for the venture investors and also to help venture investors maximize their own interests by regulating venture capitalists＇ activities so that the venture investment market becomes more prosperous and develops more healthily.