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管理层持股的利益趋同效应研究——基于中国A股上市公司盈余持续性的检验 被引量:27

RESEARCH ON ALIGNMENT EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP——Empirical Study on Earnings Persistence Based on A-share Listed Companies
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摘要 管理层持股对公司盈余影响有"利益趋同"和"壕沟防御"两种效应。本文采用股权分置改革后中国A股上市公司2007年至2010年样本,基于盈余持续性的视角,研究了管理层持股的利益趋同效应。研究发现管理层持股能显著提高上市公司的盈余持续性,进一步研究还发现董事会和高级管理人员的作用强于监事会。本文不仅丰富了管理层持股对盈余持续性影响的研究,而且获得了管理层持股"利益趋同"作用的支持性验证,说明股权分置改革后"内部人控制"不再是制约管理层持股的制度障碍。本文研究支持上市公司和监管层积极看待管理层持股,并建议上市公司区别制定有效股权激励计划,通过不断完善资本市场和公司治理结构,更好地发挥管理层持股的积极作用。 Alignment effect and entrenchment effect were two hypotheses of corporation's earnings persistence. This paper selected A-share listed companies after the equity division reform in 2007--2010, from the perspective of earnings persistence, and studied the convergence of interest effect of management ownership. This paper found that managerial ownership could significantly improve the listed companies' earnings persistence. Board of directors, supervisors and senior managers' shareholding played different roles on earnings persistence. The board of directors and senior management shareholding had more signif- icant positive effects than the board of supervisors. This paper had not only enriched the study of managerial ownership on earnings persistence, but also obtained the supportive evidence of alignment effect. The insider control was no longer the restriction factor of managerial ownership system after the equity division reform. According to this paper, listed companies and regulators should take up a positive attitude towards managerial ownership, make specific equity incentive plans, and constantly improve the capital market and the corporate governance structure.
作者 宋建波 田悦
出处 《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第12期99-109,共11页 Economic Theory and Business Management
关键词 管理层持股 利益趋同 盈余持续性 沟壕防御 managerial ownership alignment effect earnings persistence entrenchment effect
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