分红保险、代理理论与保险公司股权代理成本

Participating Policy,Agency Theory and Agency Cost of Equity in Life Insurance Firms

本文基于代理理论,结合一个简单的模型讨论了分红保险加剧保险公司股东—管理层代理冲突的机制,并以我国保险业2005～2010年的46家人寿保险公司为研究样本,利用6年的非平衡面板数据,实证检验了分红保险与保险公司股权代理成本的关系,并从代理理论的角度考察了影响分红保险在产品结构中比例的因素。结果显示:分红保险在产品结构中的占比不仅与保险公司股权代理成本存在显著的正向关系,而且会受到股东—保单持有人和股东—管理层代理冲突利弊权衡的影响。

Based on the agency theory, this paper discusses the mechanism that participating insurance policy may exacerbate the incentive conflicts of shareholder - manager in stock insurance firms. By employing 6 - year unbalanced panel data of 46 life insurance companies from 2005 to 2010, this paper tests the hypotheses regard- ing participating policy usage and agency cost of equity. The results demonstrate that participating policy usage has significant positive relationships with agency cost of equity and is affected by the trade - off of incentive conflicts between the shareholder- policyholder and the shareholder-manager.