中小企业安全生产寻租行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Rent-seeking Behavior towards of Small and Medium-size Enterprises Work Safety

为掌握中小企业(SMEs)关于安全生产寻租行为的演化规律,遏制其对政府监管执行者进行寻租,基于中小企业安全事故频发的现状、特点及其内在行为动机,运用演化博弈理论,建立中小企业与安监执行者支付矩阵,分析中小企业与安监执行者交往过程的演化博弈模型。研究结果表明,中小企业寻租演化系统收敛于理想状态和不良"锁定"状态2种模式;通过调节模型中的参数能够跳出不良"锁定"状态,向理想方向演化;构建中小企业安全生产服务体系、完善各项制度和加强道德教育有助于遏制中小企业对政府监管者的寻租行为。

To find out the evolution law of rent-seeking behavior of SMEs, and to curb the rent-seeking behavior of SMEs, the situation and characteristics of frequent accidents on safety in SMEs and intrinsic motivation for SMEs are studied. The payment matrix of enterprises and government supervision performers was built based on the method of evolutionary game. The evolution model of the associations between enter- prises and government supervision performers was analyzed. The results show that the evolution system of rent-seeking behavior converges on two patterns： an ideal status and a＂locked＂ status, that through adjus- ting model＇s decision parameters, the system may jump out of the＂ locked＂ status and evolutionary route gradually inclines to expected objective, arriving at optimizing supervision strategy, and that the rent-see- king behavior of SMEs are cured through putting forward building service system about work safety of SMEs, improving the system and strengthening moral education.