摘要
文章介绍了我国中小企业在当前国民经济中的地位和融资难情况,基于在信贷过程中中小企业和商业银行的信息不对称现状,建立了合理的数学和博弈模型,分析中小企业贷款难的原因。文章认为银行无法在为中小企业贷款的收益与风险中取得平衡,企业融资成本的高低对银行放贷收益也没有确定影响,双方信息不对称导致银行对中小企业逆向选择。文章最后认为银企双方自身无力妥善解决这一问题,并从政府角度给出解决建议。
The article describes China's SMEs current position and difficult financing situation in the national economy, established a reasonable mathematics and Game Theory Model analysis the reasons of SMEs difficult loans based on informational asymmetry between SMEs and commercial banks during the credit process. The article argues that the bank unable to get balance between gains and risk during loans to SMEs, and financing cost of the enterprise also has uncertain influence to the bank' s lending revenue, adverse selection of bank caused by asymmetric information. Finally the article argues that both SMES and banks are unable to properly solve the problem, and we give some suggestions from the angle of the government.
出处
《价值工程》
2013年第1期123-126,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
企业
贷款融资
信息不对称
博弈
SMEs
bank loan financing
information asymmetry
Game