摘要
由于国有企业CEO薪酬由国资委决定,CEO权力无法影响自身薪酬,因此国有企业CEO薪酬可能并不适用管理层权力假说,但现有文献结论并非如此。规模、行政垄断以及业绩是高管薪酬契约最主要的决定因素,管理层权力对其影响较弱,因此仅仅在回归中控制行业、规模、所有制等因素,所得结论可能并不稳健。本文以2007—2010年间4277个A股上市公司为样本的研究发现:在控制行政垄断与规模因素后,非国有企业CEO权力与CEO薪酬显著正相关,而国有企业CEO权力与CEO薪酬不符合管理层权力假说。本文研究有助于丰富薪酬管理层权力假说,有助于理解CEO权力在薪酬决定中的作用。
In state-owned enterprises ofChina,since CEOs' compensation is decided by SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission),CEOs themselves may not influence their compensation even they are powerful.This means CEOs' compensation may not consistent with managerial power hypothesis in state-owned enterprises,which is opposite to the study recently.In the contract of CEO compensation,firm size,monopoly and performance are the most important factors,while management power is weakly related with CEOs' compensation.As a result,the conclusion made only by controlling industry,firm size and ownership may not be solid.Based on 4278 observations of A share listed companies from 2007 ～ 2010,we find that after we control monopoly and firm size,CEO power is positively related with CEOs' compensation in non-state-owned enterprises,while the relationship between CEO power and CEOs' compensation is not consistent with managerial power hypothesis.Our study is complement for managerial power hypothesis,and help us understand the relationship between CEO power and CEOs' compensation better.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第11期33-38,94,共6页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号71172221)对本文的资助
