基于多任务委托代理的公交补贴激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Public Transportation Subsidies Based on Multi-task Principal-agent

合理的政府补贴是解决公交亏损问题的关键。由于公交公司与政府间存在委托代理关系,同时公交经营必须兼顾经济效益与社会福利,所以本文从定量角度建立了最优政府补贴的委托代理模型。通过求解及对解的分析,讨论了最优补贴合约的影响因素,以及激励机制对公交企业努力程度的影响。研究还表明在政府无法衡量公交公司在增加社会福利上的努力时,则对该项任务不应进行激励,同时弱化对增加经济效益的激励。研究结果为制定合理的政府激励补贴提供了参考依据。

Reasonable government subsidy is the key to solve the problem of public transportation losses. Principal-agent relationship exists be tween bus company and government ,besides the public transport operation must take account of economic benefits and social welfare, so this pa per, from the perspective of quantitative analysis, establishes the optimal contract model of government subsidies by theory knowledge of multi-task principle-agent, and solves it. Then it discusses the influence factors in the optimal contract as well as the influence which incentive subsidies make on the enterprise effort degree based on analysis of the solution. The research findings also show that government should not stimulate endeavors spent in increasing social welfare, when the level of effort can＇t be observed, while decrease the incentives given to the effort increasing economic efficiency. The results provide a reference for the government makes a reasonable incentive allowance.