企业并购影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性吗?——基于中国国有上市公司的实证分析

Does Corporate Merger and Acquisition Influence Executive Compensation and Performance?——Analysis of Chinese State-owned Listed Companies

本文以中国沪深股市2006-2010年间作为买方发生并购行为的362个国有上市公司为研究对象,分析了公司并购行为对高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感度的影响。研究发现,公司资产回报率、市场回报率与公司高管薪酬显著正相关。说明并购前,高管薪酬与资产回报率以及市场回报率显著正相关,即高管薪酬与公司业绩敏感度较高。并购所增加的会计业绩和市场业绩与高管薪酬在10%的水平下显著负相关。可见,企业并购显著降低了高管薪酬与公司资产回报率以及市场回报率的业绩敏感度。并购规模无论是通过会计绩效还是市场绩效检验分析,都显著与高管薪酬正相关,说明高管薪酬与并购规模的扩大显著正相关。为进一步分析并购绩效是否会影响高管薪酬变动,本文采用差分模型分析了高管薪酬变化值与并购业绩变化值和并购规模变化的关系,研究发现,高管薪酬的变化与并购绩效无显著的相关关系,而与并购增加的公司规模显著正相关。

The article takes 362 state-owned companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as study objects. They were the buyers in the merger and acquisition (M & A) during 2006-2010, and are used to analyze the correlation of M & A on the compensation of executives and the company performance. The study shows before M & A, the executive compensation had significant positive correlation of returns on corporate assets, market returns, i.e. the relationship of executive compensation and corporate performance is highly sensitive. Nonetheless, market performance added through M & A had little correlation with executive compensation, in a level of less than 10%. The study finds that the change of executive compensation has significant relationship with the company size expanded through M & A while not with the performance of M & A.