基于两阶段信息甄别的公共服务外包最优报酬机制研究

Research on the Optimal Payment Mechanism in Public Service Outsourcing based on a Two-stage Screening Model

为减少公共服务外包中的逆向选择问题,本文建立了利用"招标价格上限"及"报酬给付方式"两个基本报酬工具来对承包商信息进行综合考量的两阶段信息甄别机制。在这种机制下,政府可以通过合理设定招标价格上限来对承包商进行初步筛选,并通过设计不同报酬给付方式完成对剩余竞标承包商的进一步甄别。研究表明,当政府将招标价格上限设置在其所能接受的高成本承包商成本和保留效用之和的水平上,并设计一组具有不同奖惩系数的合同供竞标承包商选择时,政府能够实现对承包商的有效甄别。

This paper established a two-stage screening mechanism to reduce adverse selection in public service outsourcing by using two basic payment tools ＂bidding price cap＂ and ＂payment method＂ . Under this mechanism, the government sets the bidding price cap on a reasonable level first, and then provides contractors with a series of contracts which differ in payment methods. To make the mechanism work, the bidding price cap must equal to the sum of the highest cost which the government can stand and the contractors＇ reservation utility, and the contracts must have different reward coefficient and penalty coefficient.