摘要
通过考察国企部分民营化后政策性负担的变化,文章为政府干预与我国国企部分民营化后业绩滑坡之间的关系搭建了一座中间桥梁,并提供了相应的治理手段。研究表明,国企部分民营化后的政策性负担显著增加,且国企所在地区扩大就业的需求越大,其政策性负担的增加就越显著。而政策性负担的增加对国企部分民营化后的经营绩效有显著负面影响,加剧其业绩滑坡。进一步的研究还表明,无论是IPO发行从配额制向核准制转变的市场化改革,还是各地区市场化进程的推进,都能显著减小我国国企部分民营化后政策性负担的增加程度,从而可以成为提高部分民营化成效的重要治理手段。
By investigating the changes in policy burdens after Chinese SOEs share issue privatization (SIP), this paper builds a bridge between government intervention and SOEs underperformance after their SIP, and provides corresponding governance tools. The results show that, there exists a significant increase in policy burdens after SOEs SIP, and greater demand for employment expansion in the areas in which SOEs are located leads to more significant increase in policy burdens of SOEs. The increase in policy burdens has a significantly negative effect on the operating performance of SOEs after their SIP and could strengthen their underperformance. Further analysis shows that, both of the shift of Chinese IPO issuance system from quota to approval system, and the process of marketization, can help to sig- nificantly reduce the increase degree of policy burdens after SOEs SIP, so they can be the effective governance tools to improve the performance of SOEs' SIP in China.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期71-81,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC630112)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2012M511873)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(13wkpy20)
中山大学青年教师起步计划(1188140)的资助
关键词
政策性负担
部分民营化
业绩滑坡
市场化改革
policy burden share issue privatizatiom underperformance marketization reform