基于政府激励的再制造闭环供应链定价策略及协调机制研究

Pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain based on government incentives

针对一类由制造商、零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链系统,考虑政府奖惩激励措施,应用博弈论方法研究了新产品和再制造产品无差别定价时集中决策和分散决策模式下的定价策略,得出了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和最终利润。研究表明,政府激励环境中一定条件下闭环供应链的集中决策效率高于Stackelberg的博弈分散决策,通过设计一个收益共享协调定价机制,合理分配了制造商与零售商的利润,实现了闭环供应链的协调,进而分析了政府奖惩激励环境下闭环供应链协调运作中再制造过程利润超过制造过程的再制造优先条件,对再制造优先运作模式进行了探索。

For a kind of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system consisting of manufacturers with retailers, the game theory was used to study the pricing strategy under centralized and decentralized decision making at the indifference pricing of new products and remanufacturing products by considering government incentives. The closedloop supply chain＇s optimal pricing and final profit were also obtained. The research results showed that the centralized decision making efficiency of closed-loop supply chain under certain constraint was higher than Stackelberg game decentralized decision making with governmental incentives. A revenue sharing coordination pricing mechanism was designed to distribute manufacturers and retailers＇ profits, and the coordination for closed-loop supply chain was achieved. The priority conditions of remanufacturing on which the remanufacturing process profits were higher than manufacturing process profits in closed loop supply chain coordination management with government incentives were analyzed to explore the remanufaeturing priority operation mode of closed loop supply chain.