低碳经济博弈中的收益分配问题：Shapely值方法的一个应用

The Income Distribution Problems in the Low-carbon Economy Game: An Application of the Shapely Value Method

运用Shapely值方法探讨解决低碳经济博弈中的收益分配问题,并提出引入参与者意愿来对传统的Shapely值方法进行修正,从而提高其运用的准确性和可操作性。同时以清洁煤技术中联合建厂的投资分配为算例,验证了改进的Shapely值方法的正确性。分析结果表明,将改进的Shapely值方法应用于低碳经济中的收益分配问题,可以有效地解决低碳经济博弈中的利益冲突问题。

In this paper, the Shapely value method is used to solve the income distribution problems of the low carbon econo- my game, and by introducing the desire of the participants to improve the traditional Shapely value method, which improved the accuracy and operability of the Shapely value method. Meanwhile, the investment distribution of jointly establishing the factory in the clean - coal technology is use to prove that the improved Shapely value method is correct and operable. Results show that, if the improved Shapely method value is applied to solve the income distribution problems, it can effectively solve the interest conflicts in the low carbon economy game.