高管过度自信、政治联结与并购绩效——基于中国民营上市公司的实证研究

Top managers' overconfidence,political connections and acquisition performance:evidence from the private companies in China

信息不充分时,过度自信的高管往往因高估自身能力而导致较差的并购绩效.增加高管信息是减少此种不良并购绩效的关键,政治联结也因增加高管信息而有利于并购绩效.当过度自信的高管具有政治联结时,其获取信息增多,从而改善了不良的并购绩效.基于深沪两市民营上市公司2004～2007年间发生的411起并购数据,使用事件研究方法、多元回归方法和方差图分析方法,研究发现:(1)高管过度自信对并购绩效有显著的负向影响,支持了自大理论;(2)高管政治联结并非直接、正向地影响并购绩效,而是通过削弱高管过度自信对并购绩效的负面影响来发挥作用.这一发现不仅表明了高管政治联结的新"用途",也表明了自大理论适用的一个新的"边界条件".

When information is not sufficient,overconfidence＇s top managers often overestimate their ability to executive poor performance acquisitions.Increaseing top managers＇ information is the key of reducing such bad acquisition performance.Political connections which can increase top managers＇ information are good for acquisition performance.The bad acquisition performance could be improved,when the overconfidence＇s top managers have political connections which could give them more information.Based on the 411 events of acquisition of the private listed companies＇ from 2004 to 2007 in china,the paper uses the methods of event analysis,multi-regression and variance analysis table,and finds that：（1）top managers＇ overconfidence is significantly negative influence on acquisition performance,which supports the theory of hubris;（2）top mangers＇ political connection is not directly positive influence on acquisition performance,but is indirect influence on acquisition performance by top managers＇ overconfidence.The results not only indicate the new value of top managers＇ political connection,but also state clearly the boundary conditions of the theory of hubris.